On the Byzantine fortune of Eustratios of Nicaea's commentary on Books I and VI of the "Nicomachean Ethics" by Trizio, Michele
 
 
On the Byzantine fortune  
of Eustratios of Nicaea’s commentary on Books I and VI  
of the Nicomachean Ethics 
MICHELE TRIZIO 
While philologically dependent on Proclus, Eustratios of Nicaea’s com-
mentary on Books I and VI of the Nicomachean Ethics was highly 
influential in the Latin West. Eustratios’ defence of the Platonic Ideal Good, 
which criticizes Aristotle’s interpretation in Book I of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, was accepted by the Medieval Latin masters as a Christian defence 
of divine exemplarism.1 Furthermore, thinkers like Albert the Great under-
stood Eustratios’ Neoplatonic views on human intellect, according to which 
it acquires knowledge from above and participates in the separate nous, as 
the Byzantine version of the Arabic theories on the so-called copulatio intel-
lectus, i.e. the idea that men’s ultimate happiness consists in joining the 
separate substances intellectually.2 
However, the history of Eustratios’ Byzantine legacy has yet to be writ-
ten. We know very little about the circulation of his commentary on Books I 
and VI of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and the lack of a modern critical 
edition of these texts frustrates an accurate appraisal of Eustratios’ influence 
on the later generations of Byzantine thinkers. The aim of this paper is to 
sketch some characteristics of this legacy by analysing the cases of some 
important Late Byzantine readers of Eustratios, in particular, the fourteenth-
century scholar Nikephoros Gregoras, in order to prepare the basis for a fu-
ture and more detailed reconstruction of Eustratios’ Byzantine fortune.3 
 
Some observations on the text 
In his well-known book on the tradition of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost 
commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, the Aristotle scholar Paul 
Moraux describes Eustratios as a pedantic and boring scholar, mainly 
known for being verbose, prolix and repetitive.4 Surprisingly, this view has 
                                                
1 See Giocarinis (1964) and Steel (2002). 
2 See Trizio (2009a). 
3 On the general topic of the Byzantine tradition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, see the 
informative paper by Benakis (2009). 
4 Moraux (1979: 6). As far as I know only Conley (1998: 56) attempted discussing some 
features of Eustratios’ style. Conley found striking linguistic similarities between 
200    Michele Trizio 
 
 
been accepted by most Byzantinists, even though it merely perpetuates the 
traditional stereotype concerning Byzantine authors often presented by 
scholars of ancient philosophy and literature.5 No one seems to have real-
ized that Moraux’s negative evaluation of Eustratios depends on his view of 
the development of the Aristotelian commentary tradition: ‘Malheureuse-
ment’, writes Moraux, ‘celui-ci ne résiste pas toujours à la tentation de mê-
ler ses propres considerations à celles qu’il doit à son prédécesseur.’6 
                                                                                                                       
Eustratios’ treatise on meteorology edited by Polesso-Schiavon (1965–66) and the so-called 
Synopsis of Aristotle’s Rhetoric written by Eustratios’ teacher John Italos and edited by 
Cereteli (1926). For instance, formulas such as ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτων µὲν ἱκανῶς, ἤδη ἀρ-
κτέον δὲ τοῦ προκειµένου are nearly identical in both texts. Conley concludes that these 
treatises were addressed to younger readers ‘not altogether comfortable with philosophical 
Greek’. Whereas one might agree with Conley that the readers of these texts were not well 
versed in philosophy, I am not fully persuaded that the formulas and expressions discussed 
by him can serve as clear-cut cases to establish that these texts were written for unac-
quainted readers. In fact, these formulas, found also elsewhere in Eustratios’ works, are 
taken from the antique and late antique commentary tradition, and are found frequently in 
important authors like Theophrastus (Hist. plant. 7.15.4.7–9), Alexander of Aphrodisias (In 
Metaph. 239.3), Themistius (In Phys. 118.1–3; In De an. 38.34–35; 39.5–7; 115.13–15; In 
An. pr. I 46.20–21) and Philoponus (In Meteor. I 3.19–20). The same holds true for other 
formulas mentioned by Conley (1998: 51), such as ἐκ τῶν εἰρηµένων φανερὸν … νῦν ἂν 
εἴη λεκτέον, which occur, among many authors, in Aristotle himself (An. pr. 46b38–40) 
and in Themistius (In Phys. 227.4–5). Furthermore, Conley (1998: 59) regards Eustratios’ 
fondness for syllogisms in his theological and philosophical works as evidence in favour of 
‘Eustratios’ affiliation with his master Italos’. For example, Conley refers to In Eth. Nic. VI 
306.23–26 (καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήµη ἡ φρόνησις οὔτε τέχνη ἐστίν. ἐπιστήµη µὲν γὰρ οὐκ 
ἔστιν, ὅτι πρακτική ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ γίγνεται· πᾶν δὲ τὸ πρακτὸν ἐνδέχεται 
ἄλλως ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιστητὸν οὐχί· οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήµη ἡ φρόνησις). Obviously one can-
not dismiss the idea of a link between Eustratios and his master, but the style of this pas-
sage refered to by Conley can be easily traced back to the late antique way of commenting 
on Aristotle, such as in Philoponus (In An. pr. 250.28–33: ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀτελές, τὸ δὲ ἀτελὲς 
οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἀγαθόν. Πόθεν ὅτι ἀτελὲς ἡ ἡδονή; πᾶσα ἡδονὴ κίνησις, 
ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἀτελής. πόθεν ὅτι τὸ ἀτελὲς οὐκ ἀγαθόν; τὸ ἀτελὲς ἢ 
τῷ ἐνδεῖν ἢ τῷ ἐκπεπτωκέναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τελειότητος ἀτελές ἐστιν, ἑκάτερον δὲ τού-
των οὐκ ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἀτελὲς ἄρα οὐκ ἀγαθόν). Needless to say, these similarities make it 
even more urgent to investigate how Eustratios inherits and adapts the language and way of 
commenting characteristic of the late antique commentators. Unfortunately this task cannot 
be accomplished here, even though one cannot help but notice that even Eustratios’ habit 
(e.g. In An. po. II 171.15–16; In Eth. Nic. VI 284.30; 289.1; 326.17; 339.14) to provide the 
reader first with a general explanation of each lemma, and then with an explanation of each 
part of the same lemma was common among the late antique Aristotelian commentators 
and among the Neoplatonists, like Eustratios’ hero Proclus (e.g. In Alc. 156.16–17). 
5 See e.g. Fryde (2000: 54) where the author explicitly relies on Moraux for his evaluation 
of Eustratios’ work. 
6 Cf. Moraux (1979: 81). Curiously, while dismissing Eustratios as a repetitive and prolix 
author, scholars tend to praise Michael of Ephesus as the most accomplished scholar and 
commentator of his time. This view is found for example in Hunger (1978: 34–35), and 
Wilson (1983: 183), on the grounds that while commenting on Aristotle Michael often 
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Clearly Moraux condemns Eustratios for not strictly performing his task as 
commentator when Eustratios inserts his own views instead of Aristotle’s, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and the other Peripatetic commentators’ posi-
tions. However, one might fruitfully wonder—the high quality of Moraux’s 
book nothwithstanding—why we should criticize an early twelfth-century 
Byzantine commentator on the ground that his way of commenting upon 
Aristotle does not fit with the antique and late antique rules. Quite on the 
contrary, one should evaluate Eustratios’ philosophical works with refer-
ence to the contemporary canons and the social context of Eustratios’ activ-
ity, namely the erudite circle of readers around some important member of 
the imperial court.7 This is confirmed by Eustratios’ appeal to the indul-
gence of his readers, defined as φιλόλογοι, when he apologizes for his long 
Neoplatonic digressions in the explanation of the Aristotelian text,8 and by 
his claim to have written his commentary on Book II of the Posterior Ana-
lytics on the request of certain friends.9 Despite the emphasis on rhetoric10 
                                                                                                                       
compares readings from different manuscripts. Eustratios, however, also does the same 
(e.g. In Eth. Nic. VI 304.5; 339.15; 339.37; 373.10; In An. po. II 84.24; 174.28) and, 
moreover, he often attempts to explain Aristotle ex Aristotele by referring to what the 
philosopher says elsewhere or by comparing and discussing different views of Aristotle on 
the same subject found in different works, like in In An. po. II 154.8ff., which regards 
Aristotle’s notion of absolute and conditional necessity. Interestingly, those who actually 
critically edited Michael of Ephesus’ works, like Mercken (1990: 433ff.) and Ebbesen 
(2002: 23), seem to contradict the generally accepted characterization of Michael as an ac-
complished scholar by remarking that he often confines himself to a merely explanatory 
and repetitive attitude to Aristotle’s text. 
7 Cf. Browning (1962: 1–12), who reasonably points to princess Anna Komnene as the very 
sponsor of Eustratios’ activity as a commentator. However, I am not persuaded that there 
are enough elements favouring Browning’s view on the so-called ‘philosophical circle’ 
around Anna. On this point scholars tend to be more prudent than Browning. For example, 
in a famous article on the 11th–12th century high class literary circles, Mullett (1984: 178) 
commented on Browning’s views by remarking that ‘… evidence of an independent literary 
salon of her own [i.e. Anna Komnene], as distinct from that of her mother, is so far 
lacking’. Seemingly, Conley (1998: 59–60) suggests an account of Eustratios’ activity as 
commentator different than Browning’s, suggesting that Eustratios might have started to 
work on his philosophical commentaries before his involvement with Anna Komnene, as 
witnessed by the dedicatory preface to Empress Mary of Alania (d. after 1103) found in 
Eustratios’ treatise on meteorology. 
8 In Eth. Nic. VI 294.28. 
9 In An. po. II 123.27–28. 
10 As a matter of fact, Eustratios’ reference to a request by friends in In An. po. II 123.27–
28 (διὰ τὴν τῶν ἑταίρων ἀξίωσιν) reflects similar references found in late antique 
literature, such as in Galen (De compositione medicamentorum per genera libri vii 887.18). 
References to friends or φιλόλογοι are often found in highly educated authors of that time. 
John Mauropous, for example, who is to be regarded as one of the most important 11th-
century authors, claims (Epigr. 1.28) to have composed his collection of epigrams for the 
sake of the erudite ‘lovers of letters’. Surely these references are to be regarded as forms of 
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that is evident in these references,11 all the evidence suggests that these texts 
were destined for erudite and highly educated readers—the erudite philolo-
gists mentioned by Eustratios—rather than young students. 
Determining the social status of both the writer and the intended audi-
ence of a Byzantine work from a text’s style and characteristics is a tricky 
task as one can easily misinterpret literary quotes, expressions, and the us-
age of classical material as being academically specialized, when such a 
style may have been commonplace for contemporary Byzantine authors. 
The task becomes even more difficult if one bears in mind that those schol-
ars who rightly posed and tried to solve this methodological problem did not 
investigate Byzantine philosophical material.12 Thus, speculation on the 
quality of Eustratios’ commentaries must involve some features that would 
position his works within the highly educated literary society. In this regard, 
Eustratios noticeably enriches his commentaries on Aristotle’s text, espe-
cially the Nicomachean Ethics, with quotes and references to the tragic 
poets. For example, while describing the case of someone who knows 
rationally what is the right thing to do but acts wrongly because of the inter-
ference of the passions, Eustratios refers to the case of Medea (In Eth. Nic. 
VI 279.35–280.2), who killed her children in a fit of rage, even though she 
knew her act was irrational. 
Other features relevant to the reassessment of Eustratios’ traditionally 
negative evaluation concern the author’s reference to Homer as a model of 
rhetoric. In his commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics 
(268.27–33), Eustratios refers to the idea that in God there are neither future 
events nor contingency, ‘for He knows things instantly and in a necessary 
manner’ (ὡς τῆς γνώσεως αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ νῦν τε οὔσης καὶ ἀναγκαίας). 
Describing God’s knowledge, he contends that the First Cause knows things 
in a unified manner since He is the One and the superabundant and super-
substantial Cause of everything, ‘and because of this He embraces 
everything present, future and past in a non-conceptual and supersubstantial 
manner’ (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα περιέχοντι ἀνεννοήτως τε καὶ ὑπερου-
σίως τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσόµενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα). Despite the Christian over-
                                                                                                                       
rhetorical captatio benevolentiae lectoris, but they cannot be considered as merely ficti-
tious. 
11 In Eth. Nic. I 1.13–23; In Eth. Nic. VI 256.3–258.30. As already pointed out by Rose 
(1871: 70) and later by Mercken (1973: *11), the first passage mentioned is an inter-
polation, maybe by Eustratios himself. 
12 On this and other similar problems see Hunger (1974: 148); Ševčenko (1974: 69–76; 
1981: 312); Wilson (1975); Kazhdan (1982); Mullett (1984: 183–87); Magdalino (1984: 
92–111). 
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tones,13 Eustratios clarifies that the expression ‘present, future and past’ was 
meant ‘to speak Homerically a little’ (ἵνα καὶ καθοµηρίσω µικρόν).14 The 
extremely rare expression ‘to describe something Homerically’ (καθοµηρί-
ζειν) is first found in the funeral oration for Basil the Great by Gregory the 
Theologian,15 whom Michael Psellos regarded as the best model of Chris-
tian rhetoric,16 while Joseph Rhakendytes explicitly refers to Gregory as the 
source for καθοµηρίζειν in his Synopsis artis rhetoricae.17 Eustratios’ use of 
this term exemplifies his intention to enrich his commentaries with refined 
expressions, rhetorical topoi, and quotes from classical authors that might 
have corresponded to his readers’ tastes. 
Following Hermogenes, who considered Homer as the best of poets, 
rhetors and prose-writers,18 the Byzantines credited Homer with the inven-
tion of rhetoric, and this belief was reasserted throughout both primary and 
higher education.19 While we need not lengthily discuss the use of Homer 
among Byzantine authors, one cannot help but notice that similar erudite 
references to Homer enrich Eustratios’ commentaries. Furthermore, many 
deem Eustratios one of the most important Byzantine witnesses to attribute 
the Margites to Homer, although Eustratios’ reference to Archilochus (In 
Eth. Nic. VI 320.39–321.1) as support has been considered so unreliable that 
it suggests a textual emendation from Ἀρχίλοχος to Ἀρχιλόχοις (nowadays 
accepted as the authentic reading), which is suggested by Eustratios’ 
reference also to Cratinus, who is credited with being the real author of the 
Archilochuses.20 Unsurprisingly, then, Eustratios accounts (In Eth. Nic. I 
92.10–14) for Aristotle’s reference to Priam in the so-called ‘Trojan Cycle’ 
(Eth. Nic. I 10, 1110a7–8) as an example of someone who, once prosperous, 
fell into disgrace as an old man, remarking that Homer was the best among 
                                                
13 Compare In Eth. Nic. VI 268.30–31 (ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἑνὶ καὶ ὡς αἰτίῳ πάντων ὑπερ-
ηπλωµένῳ τε καὶ ὑπερουσίῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα περιέχοντι ἀνεννοήτως τε καὶ ὑπε-
ρουσίως τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσόµενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα) with Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, De 
div. nom. 189.4–5 (πάντα δὲ ὡσαύτως περιέχει κατὰ τὴν ὑπερηπλωµένην αὐτῆς ἀπει-
ρίαν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἑνικῶς µετέχεται). 
14 The reference is to Il. 1.70. 
15 Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 43, 17.5. The Homeric expression quoted by Gregory is ἔφεπε 
κλονέων (Il. 11.496). 
16 Michael Psellos, Orationes panegyricae 17.275ff. 
17 Joseph Rhakendytes, Synopsis artis rhetoricae 7, 593.15–17. 
18 Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγου 389.21–27. 
19 One can avoid referring to the countless bibliographies on this topic by mentioning the 
informative Browning (1992). 
20 The emendation was first suggested by Meineke (1839: 188), and accepted by Bergk 
(1853: 570). On this reference see also Davison (1968: 80–81); Bossi (1986: 40); Fowler 
(1987: 113); Gostoli (2007: 10–13). 
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the poets who wrote about Priam. Eustratios maintains that it is probable 
that Aristotle’s reference can be explained as an allegorical interpretation 
and restoration of meaning from the poetic form. In so doing, Eustratios 
interestingly ascribes to Aristotle himself the method of interpreting Homer 
allegorically, which he might have found in Origen and Clement of 
Alexandria or in the Neoplatonists, who in fact held the view that Homer 
was the best among the Greek poets.21 
Homer is not the only model of rhetoric to which Eustratios refers; he 
mentions other ancient rhetors while explaining Aristotle’s text. Along with 
Demades and Lysias, Psellos in his Encomium for John Mauropous regards 
Demosthenes and Isocrates as the best examples of pagan rhetoric, whereas 
Gregory the Theologian—as previously mentioned—is said to be the best 
model in the Christian tradition.22 Isocrates and Demosthenes are explicitly 
mentioned by Eustratios in order to enrich the explanations of some pas-
sages from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics with erudite references. For ex-
ample, Eustratios comments (In Eth. Nic. VI 355.7–10) that Aristotle’s 
reference (Eth. Nic. VI 9, 1142b3–4) to the common opinion that one should 
carry out quickly the conclusions of one’s deliberation can be traced back 
directly to Isocrates.23 As for Demosthenes, Eustratios demonstrates 
Aristotle’s claim that universal rules are derived from the particular and 
variable facts by referring to the Philippics (In Eth. Nic. VI 378.20ff.), 
where, according to Eustratios, Demosthenes attempts to discredit Philip as 
a trustworthy interlocutor precisely by mentioning particular reasons and 
facts.  
Even Eustratios’ fondness for the philosophers Plutarch and Proclus cor-
responds with the contemporaneous canons. Eustratios explicitly cites 
Plutarch twice: In Eth. Nic. I 5.14–19 concerns the definition of the intel-
lectual part of the soul as ‘daimon’; and In Eth. Nic. VI 331.29–34 applies 
Aristotle’s practical wisdom to the case of God, supporting the view that in 
this case φρόνησις refers to God’s unified knowledge of beings before their 
creation.24 As known to the specialists, among the classical authors Plutarch 
was one of the most beloved by the Byzantines. John Mauropous’ epigram 
famously requests Christ to save Plato and Plutarch because, although not 
Christian, they lived in close accordance with the Christian laws,25 suggest-
                                                
21 On this topic see Lamberton (1989: 44–82; 241–48). 
22 Michael Psellos, Orationes panegyricae 17.276–83. 
23 Isocrates, Ad Demonicum 34. 
24 The reference is to Plutarch’s De Iside et Osiride 351D. 
25 John Mauropous, Epigr. 43. With regard to the importance of Plutarch for the highly 
erudite Byzantine intellectuals Wilson (1983: 151) writes: ‘No other classical author, apart 
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ing Plutarch’s importance in the highbrow literature between the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries. As for Proclus, Psellos in his Chronographia ranks 
him highest among the philosophers that he studied during his voyage on 
the path to wisdom,26 and writes, elsewhere, that Proclus is ‘the chief of the 
most theological of the Greeks’.27 Secretly admired or publicly despised as a 
source for the heretics, Proclus certainly fascinated and influenced Byzan-
tine intellectuals between the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and, although 
Eustratios never explicitly mentioned his name, Proclus’ shadow always 
lurks behind his scholarship of Aristotle’s text.28 
Surely any attempt at evaluating Eustratios’ work must consider many 
other stylistic features, but unfortunately this would go far beyond the scope 
of the present paper. Nevertheless, it seems clear to me that the accepted 
prejudice against Eustratios as a boring and repetitive author that has gained 
a kind of tacit acceptance can no longer be regarded as representative of 
Eustratios’ real place within the history of the Byzantine philosophical tra-
dition under the Komnenoi. Interestingly, that Eustratios’ commentaries 
were not poorly written seems to be confirmed by their later fortune, in so 
far as these were read and used by many authors unanimously regarded as 
highly educated and erudite intellectuals. For example, we know that 
Theodore Prodromos, who belongs to the generation of intellectuals that 
immediately followed Eustratios, used Eustratios’ commentary on book II 
of the Posterior Analytics for his own commentary on the same Aristotelian 
work.29 More importantly, as I will demonstrate, quotes from Eustratios’ 
commentaries on Books I and VI of the Nicomachean Ethics are found also 




                                                                                                                       
from those occupying a central place in the school curriculum, was so frequently tran-
scribed.’ 
26 Chron. VI 38.1–5. 
27 Theol. 22.38–39. On Proclus and Psellos see Kaldellis (2007: 194–231). 
28 See Trizio (2009b: 90–109). On Proclus’ influence and reception in Byzantine thought, 
see Podskalsky (1976); Angelou (1984); Benakis (1987); Parry (2006). There is an inter-
esting element found in Eustratios’ commentary on Book II of the Posterior Analytics 
(206.31–33): as noted by Swift Riginos (1976: 149), Eustratios is one of the few sources 
that reports that Plato found the body of a dead Nereid. However, Swift Riginos does not 
seem to notice that Eustratios just takes this anecdote from another main source of it, 
namely Philoponus’ commentary on the Posterior Analytics (411.7–8).  
29 See Cacouros (1989). 
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Some case-studies of Eustratios’ Byzantine fortune: 
1   Pachymeres and Heliodoros of Prusa 
As probably known to specialists, George Pachymeres wrote a paraphrase 
of the Nicomachean Ethics as part of his twelve volume work, Philoso-
phia.30 What is less known is that, according to Golitsis,31 three manu-
scripts, Marcianus gr. 212 (1r–44r),32 Vaticanus gr. 1429 (1r–79v)33 and 
Escorialensis T.I.18 (1r–74v),34 contain a fragmented commentary (from 
book I to the beginning of book VI) on the Nicomachean Ethics by the same 
Pachymeres, which has often been confused in the manuscript catalogues 
with the paraphrase contained in the Philosophia. As one compares the in-
cipit of this commentary, reported by Golitsis from Marcianus gr. 212,35 
one will notice that it closely resembles the beginning of Eustratios’ com-
mentary on Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics (1.3ff.), where the com-
mentator refers to the traditional division of philosophy into the theoretical 
and the practical. A comparison of these two commentaries would be obvi-
ously helpful in determining Pachymeres’ dependence upon Eustratios, and 
I will devote future research to this topic.36 
Heliodoros of Prusa’s paraphrase of the Nicomachean Ethics (14th 
century?), edited by Heylbut in the CAG series, is an enigmatic commen-
tary, but leaving aside the problems of the author’s identity and the work’s 
composition date,37 I shall show this paraphrase’s reliance upon Eustratios’ 
own commentary.38 For example, some lines before the aforementioned 
quote from Homer, Eustratios states that God knows things ‘instantly and in 
a necessary manner’ (268.28–29), and remarks that this type of knowledge 
is grounded on the correspondence or conformity between intellect and in-
tellectual knowledge (268.29). Earlier in the text (268.10–12), Eustratios 
declared that knowledge, in general, is the assimilation between the one 
who knows and what is known, and that the knowledge of necessary things 
                                                
30 This paraphrase was edited by Oikonomakos (2005). 
31 See Golitsis (2008: 66)  
32 On this manuscript see Mioni (1981: 326).  
33 On the Vaticanus gr. 1428 see Gamillscheg & Harlfinger (1997: no. 283 and 351).  
34 On the Escorialensis T.I.18 see Revilla (1936: 449–50). 
35 See Golitsis (2008: 66–67). 
36 I ordered a microfilm of Vaticanus gr. 1429, but unfortunately I did not receive it in time 
for the present paper. 
37 Further information on this paraphrase, probably written in the 14th century, are found in 
Nicol (1968) and Moraux (1973: 137–38). 
38 On Heliodoros’ dependence upon the Greek-Byzantine commentators on the Nico-
machean Ethics, see Marcovich (1974). 
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is a necessary one (like in the case of God’s knowledge) while the knowl-
edge of contingent things is a contingent one. Interestingly, Eustratios sup-
ports this Aristotelian view found in the Nicomachean Ethics (VI 1, 
1139a10–11), which can also be traced back to the De anima (III 4, 430a2–
4), via a quote from Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus, since Eustratios 
mentions (268.21–22) the case of a form of direct knowledge of things 
which represents a mutual agreement or conformity between that which 
knows and that which is known (ὥσπερ ἐπαφή τις καὶ ἐφαρµογὴ γίνεται 
τοῦ γινώσκοντος καὶ τοῦ γινωσκοµένου πρὸς ἄλληλα),39 and thereby 
applies this notion to God’s type of knowledge. Heliodoros’ paraphrase in-
corporates the whole argument, including Eustratios’ quotation from 
Proclus, in such a way that it leaves no doubt that the author must have 
known Eustratios’ text quite well.40 
 
2   Nikephoros Gregoras’ Solutiones quaestionum 1 
The third, and most important, case-study carried out here is represented by 
Nikephoros Gregoras’ Solutiones quaestionum.41 This set of short treatises 
addressed to the Empress Helena Palaiologina (d. 1396), daughter of John 
Kantakouzenos (d. 1383) and spouse of John V Palaiologos (d. 1391), fol-
lows the traditional Byzantine model of aporias and solutions. The set of 
quaestiones, edited by Leone in 1970 together with Gregoras’ Refutation of 
                                                
39 Cf. Proclus, In Tim. 2, 287.3–5: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλήθεια εἶναι ἡ πρὸς τὸ 
γ ι νω σ κ ό µ ε ν ο ν  ἐ φ α ρ µ ο γ ὴ  τ ο ῦ  γ ι γ ν ώ σ κ ο ν τ ο ς .  
40 In Eth. Nic. VI 268.10–21: τοῖς γὰρ γινώσκουσι, φησίν, ἡ γνῶσις τοῖς γινωσκοµένοις 
ἐξοµοιοῦται, ὡς εἶναι τῶν µὲν ἀναγκαίων ἀναγκαίαν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν, ἐνδεχοµένην δὲ 
τῶν ἐνδεχοµένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἀναγκαία τῶν ἐνδεχοµένων ἡ γνῶσις, ἢ ἐνδεχο-
µένη τῶν ἀναγκαίων; ὡς γὰρ εἴ τις ἀποφαίνοιτο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ ἁπλῶς ἐνδεχό-
µενον καὶ εἴ τις τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἁπλῶς ἐνδεχόµενον τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ψεύδεται, οὕτω 
ψεύδεται καὶ ἡ γνῶσις ἡ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὡς ἁπλῶς ἐνδεχόµενον γινώσκουσα καὶ τὸ 
ἐνδεχόµενον ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. τὴν γὰρ ἀληθεύουσαν γνῶσιν, ὡς ἔχει κατὰ τρόπον τὸ 
πρᾶγµα, δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτό. ἢ εἰ µὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ὁ τὸ µὴ ὂν εἶναι λέγων 
καὶ τὸ ὂν µὴ εἶναι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἁπλῶς τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ἡ ἀλή-
θεια, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς ὀντότητος· ἄλλως τε καὶ 
ὥσπερ ἐπαφή τις καὶ ἐφαρµογὴ γίνεται τοῦ γινώσκοντος καὶ τοῦ γινωσκοµένου πρὸς 
ἄλληλα. Cf. Heliodoros of Prusa, In Eth. Nic. 114.15–24: τὴν γὰρ γ ν ῶ σ ι ν  ὁ µ ο ί α ν  
εἶναι τῷ γ ι ν ω σ κ ο µ έ ν ῳ  καὶ ἀ ν α γ κ α ί α ν  µ ὲν  τὴν τοῦ ἀ ν α γ κ α ί ο υ , 
ἐ ν δ ε χ ο µ έ ν η ν  δ ὲ  τὴν τοῦ ἐ ν δ ε χ ο µ έ ν ο υ , πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· καὶ γὰρ ἐνδεχοµένη 
γνῶσίς ἐστιν, ἥτις οὐκ ἀεὶ ἀληθεύει· ψ ε ύ δ ε τ α ι  δὲ ἡ  γ ν ῶ σ ι ς , ὅταν τὸ 
γινωσκόµενον µὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ γ ι ν ώ σ κ ε τ α ι · τὸ δὲ µὴ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ εἶχε 
τῶν ἐνδεχοµένων ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐχόντων· τῶν ἐνδεχοµένων ἄρα ἡ γνῶσις 
ἐνδεχοµένη ἐστί. διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ καὶ τ ῶ ν  ἀ ν α γ κ α ί ω ν  ἀ ν α γ κ α ί α  ἡ  γ ν ῶ -
σ ι ς · πᾶσα γὰρ γνῶσις κ α θ ’  ὁ µ ο ι ό τ η τ ά  τ ι ν α  κ α ὶ  ο ἰ κ ε ι ό τ η τ α  γίνεται· 
κ α ὶ  γὰρ ἐ φ α ρ µ ο γ ή  τ ί ς  ἐ σ τ ι  κ α ὶ  ἐ π α φ ὴ  τ ο ῦ  γ ι ν ω σ κ ο µ έ ν ο υ  κ α ὶ  
τ ο ῦ  γ ι νώ σ κ ο ν τ ο ς . 
41 On this work see Guilland (1926: 136ff.). 
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Those who Deny Men’s Miserable Condition (Antilogia), concerns different 
topics, including natural philosophy, but, interestingly, the first treatise 
strictly relates to the topic treated by Gregoras in his Antilogia, in so far as it 
concerns the place and dignity of human beings in the universe. In discuss-
ing this topic, Gregoras seems to share his master Theodore Metochites’ 
rather pessimistic view of men and the world which assumes that the insta-
bility of human affairs and the mutability of the transient world preclude 
man’s attainment of stable forms of knowledge. Metochites himself admits 
that this view was a commonplace42 as large sections of his Semeioseis 
gnomikai are devoted to the instability of human affairs, which is explicitly 
linked to ancient scepticism.43 
A discussion, however, of the sceptical tendencies in late Byzantine 
thought will not be addressed here44 since I will confine myself to the analy-
sis of one section from Gregoras’ Solutiones quaestionum 1 and its evident 
reference to Eustratios of Nicaea. After some rhetorical praise of the em-
press’ φιλοµάθεια and πολυµάθεια (488.1–489.51), which is strengthened 
by a quote from Plato’s Republic II (376c) following the same pattern as 
Eustratios’ praise of Anna Komnene’s love for wisdom and learning in his 
commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VI (256.1–257.11), Gregoras intro-
duces (489.51–490.63) the topic of Solutiones quaestionum 1. Irrational 
animals, contends Gregoras, often seem to act according to wisdom, even 
more than the wisest among men, who in fact can neither understand nor 
imitate their wisdom. Therefore, are irrational animals really irrational? The 
issue is not novel since antique and late antique philosophers debated at 
length the rationality proper to non-human animals.45 Gregoras’ positio 
quaestionis seems to be even more optimistic than the one held by Plutarch 
and Porphyry, who grant animals other than men a form of rationality and 
virtue.46 However, his initial answer is a negative one because Gregoras 
maintains that their rationality is only apparent since God Himself actually 
acts through them. The sentence ‘they are instruments of God’s activity as a 
craftsman, and they are passive, rather than active’ (490.70–71) attests that 
animals do not perform any operation on their own, but only mechanically 
and unconsciously through God’s causality (490.77–85). 
                                                
42 Cf. Ἠθικὸς ἢ περὶ παιδείας 10, 84.5–15. See also Demetracopoulos (1999: 88–93). 
43 Semeioseis gnomikai 29; 61. 
44 For an excellent account of this problem, see Bydén (2002). 
45 See, for example, Sorabji (1993); Dierauer (1997); Steiner (2005: 53–111); Labarrière 
(1984: 17–49; 2000: 107–22).  
46 See Plutarch, De soll. an. 959A–965D; Porphyry, De abst. 3.2. 
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Gregoras’ reference (490.85–491.91) to the widespread Biblical image of 
man’s creation in God’s image (Gen. 1:26–28) emphasizes the Christian 
flavour of the whole argument, in so far as only men were given a rational 
soul, whereas the other animals were just naturally provided with everything 
necessary for their survival. Surprisingly, from this assumption the author 
does not infer the rather traditional superiority of men over the other ani-
mals, but the exact opposite: the absolute humility that characterizes the 
human condition. Gregoras grounds his conclusion on his interpretation of 
Adam’s fall and man’s post-lapsarian condition, arguing (493.178–494.191) 
that had man remained in the condition in which God created us and pre-
served the rationality that characterizes us as human beings, we would re-
main superior to the nature of the irrational animals in both sense-perception 
and knowledge (493.178–81). Unfortunately, Gregoras continues, we for-
feited this condition because of our ill-advisedness and fell straight from the 
rational life to the life according to sense-perception, which is a condition 
improper to our nature and rank (493.181–84). Quoting from Exodus 2:22 
(493.184–85), Gregoras contends that in their present state men are ‘like 
strangers in a foreign land’ (ὡς ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ χώρᾳ πάροικοί τινες), pre-
cisely like Moses describes himself when he calls his first son Gherson 
(‘stranger’). By falling straight, concludes Gregoras, to the ‘life according to 
sense-perception’, men are ‘like fish out of water’, or beings out of their 
natural element (494.188–91). 
Whereas non-human animals live in perfect harmony with their natural 
state, men suffer from the gap between their previous condition (the life ac-
cording to the intellect) and their present state (the life according to sense-
perception). Despite irrational animals’ wisdom predicated upon God’s 
providence acting through them, they can be regarded as superior to men 
(494.191–98) because ‘that which exists according to nature is always and 
in any case preferable to that which exists against nature, in the same way as 
sanity is preferable to insanity and straightforwardness is preferable to de-
ception’ (494.199–201). Gregoras’ description of the loss of the Adamic 
condition reflects verbatim a passage found in Eustratios’ commentary on 
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. A comparison between the two texts 
evidences this. 
Nikephoros Gregoras, Sol. quaest. 1, 493.178–494.191: εἰ µὲν γὰρ ἐµένοµεν ε ἰς ὅπερ 
ἐπλάσθηµεν πρὸς θεοῦ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὅπερ ἦµεν ἐτηροῦµεν ἀκήρατον, ἐνικῶµεν ἂν 
καὶ κατʼ α ἴσθησιν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν καὶ γνῶσιν. Ἀλλʼ ἐξόριστοι γεγονότες διὰ 
κακοβουλίαν ἐκεῖθεν, τ ῆς λογικῆς τε ἐκπεπτώκαµεν ζ ῳῆς εὐθὺς καὶ εἰς τὴν κατʼ 
αἴσθησιν ταύτην καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἡµῖν κατηνέχθηµεν καὶ ἐσµὲν ἤδη οὐκ ἐν τῇ οἰκείας 
ἡµῶν φύσεως τάξει, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ χώρᾳ πάροικοί τινες καὶ ἐπήλυδες καὶ 
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ἀλλότριοι µὲν ἐκείνης ἧς ἐκπεπτώκαµεν, ἀλλόφυλοι δʼ ἧς ἔχοµεν, λέγω δὴ τῆς κατʼ 
αἴσθησιν ταύτης ζῳῆς, τοῦτ’ ἐκεῖνο πεπονθότες αὐτόχρηµα, ὅπερ ἂν καὶ ἐὰν ἰχθύες 
ἐκ τ ῆς ὑγρᾶς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν διαίτης ἐς τ ὴν τ ῶν χερσαίων µετενεχθέντες 
ἡµαρτηµένην ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ καθάπαξ ἀποπεφυκυῖαν καὶ πόρρω βαδίζουσαν 
τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐποίουν ἄν. 
Eustratios, In Eth. Nic. VI 297.16–31: τέλειος γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ ἄνθρωπος παρὰ τοῦ 
δηµιουργήσαντος π έ π λ α σ τ α ι  καὶ µηδεµιᾶς λειπόµενος τῶν αὐτῷ συµβαλλο-
µένων εἰς τελείωσιν ἕξεων. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ σοφὸς καὶ οὐ µόνον δια-
νοητικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ νοερῶς ἐνεργῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον τ ῆ ς  φ υ σ ι κ ῆ ς  αὐτῷ 
τ ά ξ ε ω ς . τὸ δὲ νοερῶς ἐνεργεῖν τὸ ἀµέσως καταλαµβάνειν ἐστὶ τὰ νοούµενα 
ἁπλαῖς ἐπιβολαῖς αὐτοῖς ὑποβάλλοντα, ε ἰ  µ ὲν  οὖν µὴ τὴν τάξιν ἐκείνην καὶ τὸν 
θεσµόν, ὃν ἐκ τοῦ κτίσαντος εἴληφε, παραβέβηκεν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ 
ἀνανεύων δ ι έ µ ε ι ν ε , καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀνενδότως ἐρῶν ἀπολαύσεως, τῶν δὲ 
χειρόνων τοσοῦτον εἴχετο, ὅσον προνοεῖσθαι αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον τῆς 
προσηκούσης αὐτῷ τ ά ξ ε ώ ς  τε καὶ φ ύ σ ε ω ς , δ ι έ µ ε ι ν ε ν  ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ 
τέλειον ἀπαράθραυστον. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐλιχνεύθη περὶ τὰ χείρονα καὶ τ ῆ ς  κ α τ ’  
α ἴ σ θ η σ ι ν  ἀπολαύειν ζω ῆ ς  προτεθύµηκε τῆς πρὸς τὰ κρείττω καταπε-
φρονηκὼς ἀνανεύσεως, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἐ κ π έ π τ ω κ ε  τελειότητος, 
γενέσει τε ὑπέπεσε καὶ φθορᾷ, καὶ τὸ νοερὸν αὐτῷ ὄµµα συµµέµυσταί τε καὶ συγ-
κεκάλυπται, τῆς παχυτέρας σαρκὸς καὶ θνητῆς ἐπιθολωσάσης αὐτό, ἐντεῦθεν καὶ 
τῆς αἰσθητικῆς δέδεκται γνώσεως …. 
Gregoras echoes the very structure of Eustratios’ passage when he intro-
duces his account of man’s present condition with the same unreal condi-
tional clause as Eustratios (Gregoras: εἰ µὲν γὰρ ἐµένοµεν εἰς ὅπερ ἐπλά-
σθηµεν πρὸς θεοῦ; Eustratios: ε ἰ  µ ὲ ν  οὖν µὴ τὴν τάξιν ἐκείνην καὶ τὸν 
θεσµόν, ὃν ἐκ τοῦ κτίσαντος εἴληφε, παραβέβηκεν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν 
κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἀνανεύων δ ι έ µ ε ι ν ε ), lifting some expressions, and 
carefully paraphrasing other expressions with his own vocabulary. Among 
the many similarities, the form ἐκπεπτώκαµεν used by Gregoras (493.182) 
to describe man’s fall from his previous condition matches with the occur-
rence of the same form (ἐκπέπτωκε) in Eustratios’ passage (In Eth. Nic. VI 
297.28) describing man’s fall from his proper rank and perfection.47 
Other notions found in Gregoras further reveal his dependence upon 
Eustratios. For instance, both Eustratios and Gregoras use the notion of 
natural rank or place (φυσικὴ τάξις) to refer to men’s proper condition and 
place in the hierarchy of beings. In the above-mentioned passage, Eustratios 
links this notion to that of analogy (κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον), intending to em-
phasize the necessary correspondence between the mode of existence and 
                                                
47 Eustratios’ expression τῆς οἰκείας ἐ κ π έ π τ ω κ ε  τελειότητος seems to parallel John 
Philoponus, In An. pr. 250.32 (τῷ ἐκπεπτωκέναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τελειότητος). 
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operation of each thing and its position in the hierarchy of beings,48 since 
everything, in general, participates in the First Cause according to its place 
and rank in the hierarchy of beings.49 Proclus seems to be Eustratios’ main 
source for this idea,50 although the commentator also mentions the notion of 
θεσµός, ‘law’ or ‘ordinance’, which imparts a Christian flavour to the whole 
argument by referring to men’s violation of a divine rule.51 
Secondly, Gregoras reveals his dependence upon Eustratios’ argument by 
distinguishing between the life according to the intellect, or according to 
reason, and the life according to sense-perception.52 Despite occurring in 
many sources such as Philo,53 this dichotomy depends, at least in Eustratios, 
upon Proclus’ work, and Eustratios’ description of the life according to the 
intellect mirrors Proclus’ account of the grasping of the intelligibles via di-
rect apprehensions (ἁπλαῖς ἐπιβολαῖς).54 Nevertheless, Gregoras does not 
simply reproduce Eustratios’ arguments. Although both agree that the post-
lapsarian state entails the decay from purely intellectual to merely sensory 
cognition, they hold different views on the possible recovery from this deg-
radation. Eustratios optimistically contends that men retain the possibility to 
recover partially from the shock of the fall by recollecting the intelligible 
contents encrypted in the soul through a process starting with sense percep-
                                                
48 In Eth. Nic. VI 297.19; 297.25. This expression is also borrowed by Gregoras (Sol. 
quaest. 1 496.277). The notion φυσικὴ τάξις seems to be widespread in the Neoplatonic 
tradition, e.g. Proclus, In Parm. 821.32, and Ammonius, In Cat. 59.16.  
49 In Eth. Nic. I 49.2–3. 
50 See for example In Eth. Nic. VI 317.30–32, where Eustratios stresses the necessary unity 
and uniformity of the procession of beings from the First Cause in such a way that each 
term of the causal chain is strictly related to the one immediately superior to it by the 
possession of an element of similitude between the two terms. This argument consists of an 
abridged version of similar arguments mainly found in Proclus’ Elements of Theology, like 
in El. theol. 11.8; 21.15–18; 29.3–4; 132.29–30; Theol. Plat. 5, 103.5–6. On this passage in 
Eustratios, see Trizio (2009a: 96). 
51 In Eth. Nic. VI 297.21–22: εἰ µὲν οὖν µὴ τὴν τάξιν ἐκείνην καὶ τὸν θεσµόν, ὃν ἐκ τοῦ 
κτίσαντος εἴληφε, παραβέβηκεν …. The same link between τάξις and θεσµός is found in 
Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 1, 732.28; Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, De divinis nominibus 
224.9–10; Maximus Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium 19.24–25. 
52 In Eth. Nic. VI 297.27; Sol. quaest. 1, 493.182–85. 
53 See for instance Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 52.1–4. On the notion of ‘life ac-
cording to the intellect’ corresponding to man’s proper essence, see Iamblichus, De myst. 3, 
4.33–35; Protr. 4.2; Synesius, Epist. 137.58–59. Commenting on Book X of the 
Nichomachean Ethics, Michael of Ephesus maintains (In Eth. Nic. X 586.9–10) that the 
highest form of happiness consists in the ‘life according to the intellect’. 
54 In Eth. Nic. VI 297.20–21. See also In Eth. Nic. VI 273.5–6; 283.5–6; 314.15–16; 
315.35–36; 317.20; 378.2–3. See for example Proclus, In Parm. 704.28–34; In Alc. 246.15–
18; In Tim. 2, 313.13–15. See also Ierodiakonou (2005: 81). For Proclus’ reference to the 
notion of ‘life according to the intellect’ or ‘intellectual life’ see for example Theol. Plat. 1, 
166.21; 5, 88.15; In Parm. 1025.28. 
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tion.55 While in general Proclus’ vocabulary dominates the commentary,56 
some Christian elements sporadically enter the discussion.57 For example, in 
describing the condition that follows the loss of men’s proper perfection, 
Eustratios refers to the Neoplatonic as well as Christian image of the intel-
lectual eye of the soul ‘obstructed and veiled’ because of the fall,58 whereas 
Eustratios’ reference to the ‘thicker and deadly flesh’ that made this intel-
lectual eye turbid seems to be a direct quote from Gregory of Nazianzus.59 
Furthermore, the induction from sense perception and the awakening of the 
innate knowledge in the soul makes it possible for the human being to ‘get 
rid of the veil of ignorance’ (In Eth. Nic. VI 297.38–39), which refers to the 
veil that Moses wore before his people after talking with God (Ex. 34:29–
                                                
55 See In Eth. Nic. VI 297.31–38: ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς δέδεκται γνώσεως, 
ἀµέσως µὲν ἐνεργούσης περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα γνωστά, ἀφυπνιζούσης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τῇ 
γενέσει καταδαρθάνοντα καὶ ἐξ ὧν αὐτὴ γινώσκει καθ’ ἕκαστα πρόφασιν αὐτῷ πρὸς 
τὴν τοῦ καθόλου ὑποτιθείσης σύστασιν καὶ ἐξ ἀµέσου ἐνεργείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ, ἣν περὶ 
τὰ µερικὰ ἐπιδείκνυται, χορηγίαν αὐτῷ παρεχούσης τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐπαγωγικῶς 
συνιστᾶν, ἐξ ὧν ἀµέσων οὐσῶν ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ἀµέσων ἀφορµῶν αὐτὰς ὁ νοῦς συναγήοχε, 
τὰ ἐπιστηµονικὰ συνάγεται συµπεράσµατα. The expression ἀφυπνιζούσης δὲ καὶ αὐ-
τὸν ὥσπερ τῇ γενέσει καταδαρθάνοντα (297.32–33) seems to be a paraphrase of Plato, 
Phaedo 71d, where the process of generation is said to be in one case falling asleep, in the 
other waking up. Quite on the contrary, Eustratios’ standard account for the induction proc-
ess of the universals from the individuals (297.33–38) seems to reflect the terminology 
proper to the late ancient commentators, as is clear from Eustratios’ usage of the form 
συνιστᾶν, found for example in Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Top. 537.7–8; John 
Philoponus, In An. po. 438.2–3; In Phys. 12.20–21. See also Proclus’ aporematic argument 
in Proclus, In Eucl. I 13.27–14.4. Eustratios’ other passages where this form is used with 
regard to the constitution of the universals by induction are In An. po. II 89.5–6; 268.30–31. 
This dependence is even more clear once one compares In Eth. Nic. VI 297.31–38 
(ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς δέδεκται γνώσεως … χορηγίαν αὐτῷ παρεχούσης τὰς 
κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐπαγωγικῶς συνιστᾶν, ἐξ ὧν ἀµέσων οὐσῶν ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ἀµέσων ἀφ-
ορµῶν αὐτὰς ὁ νοῦς συναγήοχε) with John Philoponus, In An. po. 439.19–20 (ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ 
αἰσθήσεως, ὡς δέδεικται, ἐνδίδονται ἡµῖν ἀ φ ο ρ µ α ὶ  ἐ ξ  ὧ ν  τὸ καθόλου σ υ ν ά -
γ ο µ ε ν  καὶ ἐπιγινώσκοµεν).  
56 On Eustratios’ dependence on Proclus’ theory of concept formation, see Trizio (2009b: 
90–99). 
57 Ibid. 99–103.  
58 In Eth. Nic. VI 297.29–30. The expression τὸ νοερὸν ὄµµα is widespread both in pagan 
and Christian literature. For some relevant occurrences see Synesius, Epist. 154.86; 
Syrianus, In Metaph. 25.6; Proclus, In Parm. 1128.32; Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, De 
caelesti hierarchia 50.13–14; Damascius, In Parm. 94.27; Maximus Confessor, Quaes-
tiones ad Thalassium 59.112; John of Damascus, Dial. 1.27; Photios, De Spiritu Sancti 
myst., in Migne (PG 102: 77A–B); Epist. 284.478; Michael Psellos, De omn. doct. 95.7. 
59 In Eth. Nic. VI 297.30–31: τῆς παχυτέρας σαρκὸς καὶ θνητῆς ἐπιθολωσάσης αὐτό. 
Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 38, 324.46–47; Or. 45, 633.11–12. 
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35) and mentioned by Saint Paul in his Second Letter to the Corinthians 
(3:13–15).60 
Despite these Christian elements, the framework of the argument remains 
firmly Neoplatonic, because Eustratios defines the ‘common notions’ as that 
which is constituted through induction,61 while the related discursive and 
dianoetic activity of the soul serves as the starting point of the recollection 
process.62 Thus, the human being can ‘regain his power and capacity by get-
ting rid of the burden of being affected by passions, and strive again for the 
higher realities and his Creator’.63 Elsewhere, Eustratios expounds this very 
same argument without any Christian references by simply elaborating on 
Proclus’ distinction between intellect by essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν) and intellect 
by disposition (καθ’ ἕξιν). The former refers to the Separate Intelligence that 
acts and operates by its own essence and possesses all the intelligibles in an 
unitarian and concentrated manner; the latter refers to the particular 
intelligent soul that only performs intellection through participating in the 
above-mentioned Separate Intelligence, and only possesses the intelligibles 
dianoetically, or as echoes (ἀπηχήµατα) of the Forms found in the Sepa-
rate Intelligence.64 Like Proclus, Eustratios maintains that even when the 
soul becomes capable of reverting upon the separate and higher substances, 
it cannot perform intellection in the way proper to the Separate Intelligence 
                                                
60 However, the precise expression used by Eustratios, namely ‘the veil of ignorance’ (τῆς 
ἀγνοίας κάλυµµα) is only found in Origen, Contra Celsum VI, 50.5–7, and in Theodore 
the Studite, Sermones Catecheseos Magnae 30, 84.36. 
61 This usage of the term ‘common notions’ (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) as the starting point for discur-
sive reasoning and the principles of scientific demonstrations can be traced back to 
Syrianus, In Metaph. 18.9–10; 21.31–34; Proclus, In Eucl. I 240.11–14; Ammonius, In De 
int. 7.16–22; Asclepius, In Metaph. 158.11–13; John Philoponus, In An. pr. 2.24–27. For a 
survey of the Neoplatonic usage of the expression ‘common notions’, see Saffrey & 
Westerink (1968: 155, n. 4), O’Meara (1986: 12–13) and Steel (1999: 295–97). Often 
Eustratios identifies the common notions with the scientific axioms, like in In Eth. Nic. VI 
319.8–9 and in In An. po. II 45.27–33. Also this usage seems to be quite traditional, as it is 
found for example in Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Top. 18.19–21). 
62 On this point see Trizio (2009b: 99–108). 
63 In Eth. Nic. VI 297.39–40: ἑαυτοῦ τε γίνεται καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τῆς ἐµπαθείας ἀποφορ-
τιζόµενος, ἀνανεύει τε πρὸς τὰ κρείττω καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ποιήσαντα. This argument 
seems to be an elaboration of Michael Psellos, Orationes hagiographicae 1c 80.381–85: ἂν 
γὰρ µὴ ἐµβαπτισθείη τῷ σώµατι ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ῥοπῆς τε καὶ προσ-
νεύσεως, ἀνενεχθείη δὲ µᾶλλον οἷον ἐκεῖθεν διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὰ κρείττονα ἀνανεύσεως, 
ἑαυτῆς τε γίνεται καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιγινώσκει ἀξίωµα. 
64 In Eth. Nic. VI 317.19–28. The source for the distinction between the two types of intel-
lect, ‘by essence’ and ‘by disposition’, is Proclus, In Tim. 2, 313.1–4; In Alc. 65.19–66.6. 
The term ἀπήχηµα to describe the status of the intelligibles found in the human soul oc-
curs also in In Eth. Nic. VI 315.34; 317.23; 377.37; In An. po. II 22.25; 257.38. In using this 
term Eustratios follows Proclus, In Alc. 99.13–19; Theol. Plat. 1.125.5–8; El. theol. 
129.26–28. On this topic, see Ierodiakonou (2005: 81 n. 30). 
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because a particular soul must pass from one Form to the other,65 ‘dancing 
in a circle around the Intellect and grasping them one by one’, as Eustratios 
literally quotes from Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides.66 
Eustratios’ emphasis on induction’s stimulating and kindling effect on 
the soul’s innate knowledge derives from Proclus’ positive account of the 
role played by concepts derived from sensible data for the recollection proc-
ess.67 In fact, he often refers to Proclus’ vocabulary to describe the awaken-
ing and stimulation of the innate knowledge in the soul by means of teach-
ing and learning. For example, Eustratios follows Proclus’ usage of the term 
ἀνεγείρειν (‘to awaken’ or ‘to rouse’) to describe the beginning of the recol-
lection process,68 or the need to awaken ‘the One in us’.69 Or consider 
                                                
65 In Eth. Nic. VI 303.19–26: ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ὡς µὲν ψυχὴ ἀνειλιγµένως ἐνεργεῖ, συλ-
λογιζοµένη καὶ µεταβαίνουσα εἰς συµπεράσµατα ἐκ προτάσεων, ὡς δὲ µετέχουσα νοῦ 
ἁπλῶς ἐπιβάλλει, ἔχουσα µὲν καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τοὺς ὅρους ὡς νοῦ ἀπηχήµατα, γινο-
µένη δὲ καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα, ὅταν νοερὰ γένηται, τοῖς νοητοῖς νοητῶς ἐπιβάλλουσα, 
εἰ καὶ µὴ ἀθρόως καὶ ὁµοῦ ὡς ὁ καθ’ ὕπαρξιν, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἓν περιεχοµένη τὰ πάντα καὶ 
νοοῦσα καθ’ ἕκαστον, διὸ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις οὐ φύσις ἀλλὰ ἕξις τῆς ψυχῆς 
ὀνοµάζεται, ὡς ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιοῦσα καὶ γινοµένη ἐπίκτητος. This passage results from 
Eustratios’ elaboration of several of Proclus’ passages. (1) The distinction between the soul 
qua soul (ὡς µὲν ψυχὴ), which acts by unfolding the Forms found in itself within the 
discursive reasoning, and the soul as participating in the nous (ὡς δὲ µετέχουσα νοῦ) is 
borrowed from Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus (1, 246.5–7), where Proclus distin-
guishes between two ways for the logos to have knowledge of the eternal Being: the first is 
ὡς µὲν λόγος, characterized as discursive; the second is ὡς δὲ νοῶν, characterized as 
simple and non-discursive. (2) Eustratios’ statement on the soul qua soul as operating by 
unfolding intelligible contents (ἀνειλιγµένως) can be found in Proclus, In Eucl. I 16.10–
16; In Parm. 937.37–39. (3) The same holds true for Eustratios’ mention of the direct ap-
prehensions that characterize the soul’s intellectual activity (see n. 53). (4) The idea that the 
soul’s non-discursive thinking activity still cannot grasp the intelligibles all at once and si-
multaneously (µὴ ἀθρόως καὶ ὁµοῦ) as the nous is taken from Proclus, In Parm. 1165.24–
25. (5) Eustratios’ description of men’s intellectual capacity as ‘supervening upon the soul 
from outside’ (ὡς ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιοῦσα) and ‘acquired’ (ἐπίκτητος) seems to reflect 
Proclus’ general usage of these terms in order to describe participatory or acquired 
characteristics against the essential possession (κατ’ οὐσίαν) of them, like in In Remp. 1, 
28.17–20; In Tim. 1, 352.19–22. Needless to say, Eustratios’ distinction between νοῦς καθ’ 
ἕξιν and νοῦς κατ’ οὐσίαν just represents a particular case within the above-mentioned 
Proclean scheme. On this see Trizio (2009b: 97). 
66 In Eth. Nic. VI 303.24–25; In Eth. Nic. I 47.4–11. The source is Proclus, In Parm. 
807.29–808.11. On this quotation, see Giocarinis (1964: 191 n. 86) and Steel (2002: 52–
53). 
67 See e.g. Proclus, In Eucl. I 18.10–20. For other passages where this function performed 
by the so-called ‘later-born’ concepts is found explicitly, see Steel (1999: 331). 
68 Compare In An. po. II 22.24–28 with Proclus, In Eucl. I 18.15–20, where the author 
speaks about mathematics and its importance for anamnesis, contending that the recollec-
tion process needs to be referred to the innate logoi of the soul, but it must be ‘awakened 
from that which is later born’ (ἀνεγείρεται ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων). 
69 Like in Proclus, In Parm. 1072.7–8. 
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Eustratios’ reference to the expression ἐκπληττόµενοι (men’s ‘being aston-
ished’), found verbatim in Proclus regarding the effects of beauty on the 
souls for their conversion to the Good.70 Eustratios intends the latter expres-
sion to refer to the effect of the beauty of the sense perception data on the 
soul as that which moves the soul in an anagogic ascension towards the First 
Cause.71 
Quite to the contrary, despite sharing Eustratios as a source and empha-
sizing the mainly epistemological character of the fall and the loss of man’s 
perfection, Gregoras expresses a rather pessimistic view of men’s possibility 
to recover from the miserable condition that characterizes human beings in 
their present state.72 As a matter of fact, Gregoras maintains that if men can 
somehow be regarded as superior to irrational animals, it is only because of 
their God-given capacity for speaking, which allows them to help each other 
without remaining lonely (493.201–8). Therefore, according to Gregoras, 
we can be labelled ‘rational animals’ only in so far as we can produce 
sounds and articulate our voice. If this is the case, however, the definition 
                                                
70 Proclus, Theol. Plat. 3, 64.6–12; In Alc. 328.6–10. Börje Bydén has recently suggested to 
me a link between this passage of Eustratios and Philoponus’ commentary on De anima 3 
in the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke (40.34–37 = Sophonias, In De an. 135.19–
24). Here Philoponus describes the active intellect as making evident the beings which 
were unclear and hidden because of the torpor due to the shock of the birth. There are 
striking similarities between the two passages, especially in regard to Philoponus’ ‘propter 
id quod a nativitate nubilum’ (διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ γενέσεως κάρον), i.e. the idea that the shock of 
the birth makes the intellect unaware of the intelligible contents contained in it, which 
strongly echoes similar formulas in Eustratios. However, it is remarkable that even the 
Philoponan expression reported by Sophonias (διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ γενέσεως κάρον) occurs in 
Proclus’ commentary on the Alcibiades (226.6–7), where he contends that before tran-
scending the matter and the body the bodily potencies were sterile and poor διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ 
γενέσεως κάρον. I will devote my future research to a more detailed study of Philoponus’ 
influence upon Eustratios. Some formulas of Eustratios on the shock of the birth process or 
the disturbance of the passions as obstacles to gaining pure intellection are discussed in 
Trizio (2009b: 78–79; 101; 106) (also with regard to Philoponus). 
71 In Eth. Nic. VI 348.32–37: ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἐν σώµασι θεωρούµενα, ἅ ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ καὶ 
καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷς ἐπιβάλλοντες καὶ τὴν τούτων ποικιλίαν καὶ σύστασιν καὶ συνοχὴν 
καὶ διεξαγωγὴν ἐκπληττόµενοι ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ προσεχὲς διὰ τῆς λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς 
θεωρίας ἀνατρέχοµεν αἴτιον, ἔστ’ ἂν διὰ τῶν µέσων διακόσµων εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ 
µίαν ἀρχὴν καταντήσωµεν. The whole argument seems to be a free interpretation of 
Proclus, In Parm. 879.17–19 (ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα κοινῶν ἐπὶ τ ὸ  
π ρ ο σ ε χ ὲ ς  α ἴ τ ι ο ν  αὐτῶν ἀ ν α τ ρ έ χ ο µ ε ν , ὃ δή ἐστι πάντως εἶδος φυσικόν), 
where nevertheless Proclus speaks about the λόγοι φυσικοί. Furthermore, Eustratios’ 
reference to the ‘intermediate realms’ (διὰ τῶν µέσων διακόσµων) through which the 
ascension towards the first cause takes place reflects once again Proclus’ terminology. See 
for instance In Alc. 112.1–5. 
72 On Gregoras’ Solutiones quaestionum 1 see also Moschos (1998: 167–70), who never-
theless does not discuss the problem of Gregoras’ sources. 
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applies to men only improperly and by a misuse of language (495.240–45). 
Therefore, the traditional Stoic argument that only men can be called ra-
tional, in so far as they can articulate speech73 is dismissed by Gregoras as 
the sign of men’s lack of perfection, since, according to him, our previous 
and purer condition did not necessitate speech and language, as we could 
enjoy the same non-verbal intellection as the angels (495.222–36). Thus, 
non-human animals are superior to man because they perform their opera-
tion in perfect accordance with their rank and status; those whose life fits 
better with their present condition must be granted higher consideration than 
those who live ‘like fish out of water’.  
There are other similarities between Eustratios and Gregoras that might 
suggest that in writing his Solutiones quaestionum 1 Gregoras actually had 
Eustratios’ text in front of him, as he follows Eustratios in conceding that 
even in the so-called irrational animals there seem to be echoes (ἀπηχή-
µατα) of intelligence or rationality.74 The parallel becomes even more 
striking if one considers that according to Gregoras (491.100–108) this is 
made possible because of God’s causality, which reaches ‘the last terms’ (ἄ-
χρι τῶν ἐσχάτων) of the causation process through ‘the intermediate and 
more perfect terms’ (διὰ τῶν ἐντελεστέρων). This is clearly found in 
Eustratios too; for example, when speaking about the eternal, ungenerated 
and immaterial realities the commentator maintains that precisely ‘through 
these’ (δι’ αὐτῶν µέσων) God’s creation and providence reaches ‘even the 
last terms’ (µέχρι καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων) of the causation process.75 
 Eustratios’ emphasis on the merely epistemological consequences of the 
loss of the Adamic condition, rather than on the moral or eschatological 
ones, seems to have attracted Gregoras’ attention, even though he differs 
from Eustratios in denying that men can somehow restore partially their 
previous condition. This pessimistic view characterizes Gregoras’ opinion 
on men’s dignity elsewhere.76 While his teacher Theodore Metochites’ re-
                                                
73 On this argument cf. supra n. 45. 
74 Compare Sol. quaest. 1, 491.103 with In Eth. Nic. VI 328.15. The same idea is literally 
found in Nikephoros Gregoras, Florentius 1659–61. 
75 In Eth. Nic. VI 294.12–16. Quite to the contrary, Gregoras’ reference (491.105–6) to 
God’s causality as taking place in a ‘certain natural ordered chain’ (εἱρµῷ καὶ τάξει τινὶ 
τῆς φύσεως) is a quote from Gregory of Nyssa’s Dialogue on the Soul and Resurrection 
(Migne, PG 46: col. 129.10–11). This evidence would make it even more interesting to try 
to detect one by one the sources of Gregoras’ Solutiones quaestionum 1, which appears to 
be constructed as a patchwork of quotations taken from several different authors. Unfortu-
nately this task cannot be undertaken here; I will confine myself to the investigation of 
Eustratios’ influence on Gregoras. 
76 I would like to thank John Demetracopoulos for his precious suggestions on the other 
passages where Gregoras’ view is found explicitly. 
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marks on human misery strictly reflect his own personal misfortunes,77 
Gregoras’ distrust of mankind seems to be an unconditioned and philoso-
phically grounded one. The whole history of mankind, states Gregoras in his 
Antilogia (482.58–64), proves that human beings are miserable, after which 
he quotes Plato’s Theaetetus (146a) to demonstrate that as men seek for the 
truth they are like ‘kids playing ball in a moonless night’ (484.142).78 
Although the human intellect intends to order the events and the sensorial 
data, its attempt does not always succeed due to its weakness. That is why, 
according to Gregoras in Solutiones quaestionum 1, the human intellect’s 
detection of similarities and identities among diverse phenomena cannot 
safely establish science, and men readily forget that mental constructions 
and epistemic models do not really reflect the transient and unstable 
reality.79  
The Greek Patristic tradition elaborated on the topic of men’s dignity and 
place in the universe on the basis of several passages from the Old Testa-
ment (e.g. Gen. 1:26–28; 2:7; Ps. 8:5–9; 38:5–6; 48:13; 143:3–4). This 
could also have served as a reliable source for Gregoras, especially since he 
maintains that only Revelation and the spirituality of the Fathers of the 
Church are a reliable source of wisdom, whereas men’s knowledge is 
nothing more than shadows.80 Basil of Caesarea81 and Gregory of Nyssa,82 
for example, often stressed the fact that men fail to recognize their own 
honour and rank, which derives from being created in God’s image. Thus, 
men’s condition is humble, for they were created out of dust, that is to say 
from a humble material, and they come into being by means of sexual 
intercourse, which perpetuates sin.83 Apparently, Gregoras adheres to this 
traditional way of posing the problem, as he refers (490.85–491.91) to 
Genesis 1:26–28 (men’s creation in God’s image), but the very core of his 
understanding of Adam’s fall is Eustratios’ intellectualist interpretation of it, 
where the fall and the attempt to revert again to the Creator is described as 
the loss of purely intellectual knowledge and the need to move from discur-
                                                
77 See e.g. Theodore Metochites, Poem XIV 80–110 and Poem XV 13–29. 
78 The expression ‘moonless night’ (ἐν σκοτοµήνῃ) is taken from Ps. 10:2–3. The Greek 
Fathers agree in explaining this expression from the Psalms as referring to a state of igno-
rance. 
79 Περὶ κατασκευῆς καὶ γενέσεως ἀστρολάβου 1.19–20. 
80 Antilogia 484.143–45. 
81 Basil the Great, Homil. in Psalmos 48.21ff. 
82 Gregory of Nyssa, De op. hom., in Migne (PG 44: col. 136). 
83 See Gregory of Nyssa, De Beat. 1, 85.1–86.2. 
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sive to non-discursive thought that results from this.84 All the traditional 
philosophical arguments in favour of men’s superiority over animals, such 
as, for instance, the Stoic85 and then Christian86 ideal of living in accordance 
with nature’s providentially determined order of being, which granted man a 
superior rank than that of other animals, or the emphasis on the exclusively 
human capacity to articulate speech, are reversed by Gregoras. Eustratios’ 
interpretation of Adam’s fall offers the crucial key that allows Gregoras the 
possibility of maintaining that man fell into a condition contrary to his very 




Any thorough reconstruction of the reception of Eustratios’ commentaries in 
the Greek-speaking medieval world requires new critical editions of these 
works,87 also because some manuscripts containing the whole set of com-
mentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, which were probably compiled under 
the supervision of Anna Komnene, have important paleographical value.88 
Therefore, we can easily recognize the fruitfulness of a thorough recon-
struction of the textual tradition of Eustratios’ work, as our few case-studies 
discussed in the present paper suggest. As is well known to specialists, there 
are three thirteenth–fourteenth century Byzantine lists of Aristotle’s works 
and related commentaries and commentators, and they all mention 
Eustratios as commentator of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.89 This 
suggests once more that Eustratios was widely read by the later generations 
of authors, not only among those who worked on Aristotle’s Ethics, like 
Pachymeres and the enigmatic Heliodoros of Prusa, but also among 
Byzantine scholars like Gregoras, who must have been attracted both by the 
                                                
84 There are striking similarities between this passage by Eustratios and Isaac Komnenos’ 
De providentia et fato (48.19–49.5), which actually consists of a re-elaboration of one of 
Proclus’ Tria opuscula. 
85 See e.g. Cicero, De officiis 1.50. For an account of the Stoic view see Sorabji (1996). 
86 See e.g. Basil the Great, Homil. in Hex. 7.3; John Chrysostomos, In Gen. 8.4. 
87 Already more than 90 years ago, Mercati (1915) complained about the poor CAG edition 
by Heylbut, remarking that the editor ignored several manuscripts which could have repre-
sented a more solid base for the edition of Eustratios’ text. 
88 Consider the Coislinianus 161, collated by Heylbut for the CAG edition and attributed by 
Harlfinger (1971: 55–57) to the ‘Anonymus Aristotelicus’ who has been recently identified 
by Mondrain (2004) as a monk called Malachia. On the 13th–14th century Eustratios 
manuscripts see Mondrain (2000: 19–21). 
89 These lists, contained in the Marcianus gr. 203 (f. 293r), Vaticanus gr. 421, and Hiero-
solymitanus Sti Sep. 106 (f. 7v), are edited respectively in Wendland (1902: xvii), Hayduck 
(1885: v), and Usener (1865: 163–66). 
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philosophical content and by the style and erudition found in Eustratios’ 
text. Thus, if one considers that modern scholarship commonly regards 
Eustratios as a pedantic and boring scholar, one will not err in concluding 
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